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Memphis Blues: How Corporate Property Tax Breaks and Stadium Subsidies are Sapping the City’s Fiscal Strength

by Thomas Cafcas with Kasia Tarczynska, Philip Mattera & Greg LeRoy

Executive Summary

The City of Memphis has chosen to deliberately avoid its municipal pension obligations at the same time it has granted a series of costly property tax abatements, or PILOTs, to large corporations such as Nike and International Paper while also taking on big debt obligations to benefit other companies such as Electrolux and Bass Pro and professional sports franchises.


In 2013 the annual cost of the PILOTs to the city was \$42 million, or about 14 percent of the city’s property tax base. The debt deals will be increasing the subsidy bill more in years to come.

Sixty-four of the PILOTs have been granted to some of the world’s largest corporations and two performance audits found that more than 63 percent of the deals were not meeting job creation, wage and/or capital investment goals.

The debt deals have their own problems. The Bass Pro project involves a desperate effort to rescue the troubled Pyramid Arena by diverting a large amount of sales tax revenue to underwrite the cost of a huge retail outlet.

As part of a \$228 million subsidy package that also includes a PILOT deal, city and state bonds are being used to help finance a factory for the Swedish appliance maker Electrolux.¹ The deal

Chart 1



was negotiated secretly and provides taxpayers no money-back protection if the deal falls short.

Memphis is also on the hook for financing costs related to expensive sports facilities for the Grizzlies and the Redbirds that, like other stadium deals, are unlikely to pay off.

Giving all this financial assistance to big business costs more than the ongoing cost of providing pensions to city workers, which has averaged about \$33 million annually in recent years. Annual subsidy costs, which in 2012 were \$43.7 million, are running at about 131 percent of the pension costs.

Any honest accounting of the City of Memphis’ budget obligations, including pension

contributions, has to include its troubled history of economic development spending, which has repeatedly included serious misjudgments and high costs without verifiable benefits.

Memphis' Underfunded Pensions

Public pensions are a hot issue in Memphis. In the coming months, the city will sort out how best to shore up pension funds that were hit by the recession and underfunded by the city. Adding to the debate are different estimates from three consultants on how much is needed to shore up the city's pensions and put them on a resilient path. The state of Tennessee also recently enacted a law requiring cities to make their pensions solvent in the next six years.

Mayor A. C. Wharton has proposed shifting away from a defined benefit pension to a plan that would provide less retirement security for workers.² Other officials would like to see the pension made whole again without drastic cuts in retirement benefits to workers.

How did Memphis run into pension problems? When risky Wall Street bets launched the U.S. into a deep recession in 2007-2009, retirement assets took a hit, and Memphis pension investments were no exception. In the bleakest times, instead of shoring up its pension obligations, Memphis chose to spend scarce budget dollars elsewhere.³ But even as the economy recovered, the city repeatedly continued to underfund pensions, paying less than what actuaries reported it owed, leading to today's pension debate.⁴

While the city cut its contributions, its obligations have varied only slightly. Between 2009 and 2012, employer normal costs, or the amount the city should have contributed to pay for ongoing costs of providing pensions, ranged between \$31.1 and \$34.8 million and was \$33.5 million in 2012.⁵ (see Chart 2)

We do not utilize here the Annual Required Contribution (ARC), which is the sum of the

employer normal cost for the current year as well as payments for unfunded liabilities from

Chart 2



previous years.⁶ In order to make an apples-to-apples comparison with subsidies, we compare only current annual costs.

Pension problems in Memphis were caused primarily by the recession and the city's repeated decision to underfund.

Memphis Spending on Corporate Subsidies

Municipal budgets are moral documents, a statement of values, reflecting how a city allocates finite resources. An increase in spending in one part of the budget can symbolize a shift in priorities. Moreover, most public resources are fungible: tax dollars spent on one budget item can be shifted and spent on another.

One form of spending that Memphis has chosen to grow in recent years is economic development subsidies. These include costly property tax reductions called Payments in Lieu of Taxes, or PILOTs, and borrowing through bonds for stadiums and other redevelopment projects.

These development expenditures are poorly understood, and the records detailing their

actual costs are obscure and complicated. But given that spending on development subsidies has grown at the same time the city has chosen to underfund its pension, this report seeks to shed light on both trends.

Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs)

Since 2007, property tax reductions awarded to companies in Memphis have continued to cost the city large amounts of property tax revenues: the largest single source of revenue for the city of Memphis.⁷ These PILOTs allow up to a 90 percent reduction on a company’s real property taxes as well as its personal property taxes for up to 15 years, although additional PILOTs can be granted beyond that length of time. Since 2009, city and county agencies have awarded at least \$468 million in PILOT subsidies to companies in Memphis.⁸

The costs of PILOTs are split between Shelby County and the City of Memphis. Unfortunately, publicly available data doesn’t allow taxpayers to precisely distinguish between costs to the City and the County, but a handful of records imply the costs are divided almost evenly between them.⁹

Table 1

Year	Potential Total Property Tax Revenues (millions) ¹⁰	Memphis PILOT Subsidy Costs (millions) ¹¹	PILOTs as Percent of Potential Property Tax Revenues ¹²
2011	\$299.7	\$41.7	13.9%
2012	\$293.7	\$39.1	13.3%
2013	\$293.1	\$42.1	14.4%

In 2013, PILOTs siphoned off \$42.1 million in Memphis, or nearly one out of every seven dollars in property tax revenues.¹³ That is, about \$42 million that could have been funding public services did not flow to the city or other jurisdictions.

PILOTs are granted by Memphis and Shelby County very disproportionately compared to other localities in Tennessee. In 2013, 27 percent of all the PILOTs granted in the entire state were located in Shelby County.¹⁴

PILOTs in Memphis are awarded on a case-by-case basis by an assortment of agencies, although there are efforts to consolidate responsibilities into the city-county EDGE board. In Memphis, the following boards or agencies have some role in the awarding of subsidies:

- The Economic Development Growth Engine of Memphis and Shelby County (EDGE), formerly known as The Industrial Development Board of Memphis & Shelby County (IDB);
- Downtown Memphis Commission (also known as the City Center Revenue Financial Corporation or the Center City Commission); and
- The Health, Education, & Housing Facility Board of the City of Memphis which often awards PILOTs for multifamily affordable housing projects.

Despite PILOTs’ high costs, these agencies are not using best practices to ensure maximum taxpayer benefits. Only recently did the EDGE board, for example, shine a light on the enormous diversion of property tax revenues by posting PILOT details online.¹⁵ Worse, important metrics on outcomes over time—actual jobs created and wages paid—are often lacking on the EDGE website.

Are PILOT Subsidies Achieving Outcomes?

With such high PILOT costs, taxpayers have every right to expect strong economic development benefits. But even without systematic data on outcomes, there are numerous indications that PILOTs are falling short.

In 2013, the Memphis Consulting Group issued a report on the performance of PILOT recipients from 2011.¹⁶ The report asked key questions: have the deals created jobs at the wages promised and did companies invest capital as they had promised? The answer was frequently no.

More than three-fifths (33) of the 52 companies *self-reported* that they were failing to meet job creation goals (17 companies), wage commitments (13), and/or capital investment commitments (20).¹⁷ Worse, only 10 companies were audited. Some of the companies failing to meet their performance requirements were large, multinational corporations including FedEx, International Paper, Ford Motor Company, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, Cargill, and Nike.

In many jurisdictions, it is a common practice to independently verify the performance of subsidized companies, by methods such as audits or examination of unemployment insurance filings. Such “trust but verify” approaches to economic development prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer subsidies. In the case of Ford Motor, one of the ten companies audited, it had overstated its self-reported job creation by 31 jobs.¹⁸ Although many of the companies appeared to be out of compliance, the report made it clear that only Ford would be subject to clawbacks (that is, a repayment of some share of subsidies).

A follow-up compliance report by Memphis Consulting Group from 2014 found a similarly disturbing trend regarding diversity and local business participation goals.¹⁹ Numerous PILOT recipients that had pledged to contract with Minority- or Women-Owned Business Enterprises (MWBE) and/or Locally Owned Small Businesses (LOSBS) failed to do so. Instead of recapturing or rescinding awarded subsidies for failing to meet performance obligations, the study recommended merely informing companies in a letter of their non-compliance.

This report made no mention of any intent to utilize money-back guarantees for taxpayers.

Problem PILOTs

International Paper. In 2012, International Paper, a Fortune 500 company that has been headquartered in Memphis since 1986, suggested that it might relocate, possibly a short distance to adjoining DeSoto County, Mississippi. Memphis officials, wary of losing the company, signaled a willingness to offer IP an exceptionally long PILOT agreement—for 30 years. The proposed deal provoked a public backlash; under the pressure, the company applied for and received a regular 15-year PILOT. The new PILOT agreement will cost the city about \$25 million, in addition to the county cost of \$32 million. Besides covering existing and new properties, the deal includes a corporate jet.²⁰

Pinnacle Airlines. When this small carrier threatened to relocate its headquarters and 600 jobs to DeSoto County, Mississippi, the city offered the company a retention package that included \$3 million from the city economic development fund, a PILOT worth \$5 million over 15 years, and 500 free parking spaces. Despite the 2010 aid, in April 2012 the company filed for bankruptcy and later relocated to suburban Minneapolis.²¹

McKesson Corp. In 2009 Memphis and Shelby County adopted changes to the PILOT policy that made retention projects eligible for the tax breaks. Even though the changes were made to satisfy McKesson Corp., the company decided to move two of its six facilities from Memphis to Mississippi. Memphis lost 300 jobs and a \$115 million investment.²²

Are PILOT Subsidies Efficient for Job Creation?

On a cost per job created basis, job creation on PILOT projects are not cheap. When both city and county costs are taken into account, some

of the projects have a cost per job in excess of \$100,000. These include: United Parcel Service (\$403,405), Nucor (\$349,550) and NuVasive (\$214,701).²³

Such high costs raise a legitimate economic development issue: would city be better off investing in workforce skills, infrastructure and other public goods that benefit all employers—big and small, new and longstanding—rather than a handful of companies powerful enough to win subsidies? Maintaining infrastructure, police and fire services, public education, sanitation and other public services are essential to ensuring Memphis is an attractive place for businesses to expand, start up, or relocate.

Can PILOTs and Other Subsidies Shore up Budgets?

Media reporting on Memphis' budget spending frequently leaves out the *costs* of development subsidies. The city's budget documents are no help: for example, the city's operating budget includes PILOT revenues but seems to exclude the far more costly PILOT revenue losses, or subsidy expenditures.²⁴ This gives the false impression that PILOTs are all revenues and no cost.

Memphis isn't alone when it comes to considerable spending on subsidies. Chicago, too, spends nearly one out of every 10 property tax dollars on subsidies.²⁵ But not all places have ignored the cost of subsidies when it comes to closing budget gaps.

In California, Governor Jerry Brown looked to an expensive and growing subsidy program, Tax Increment Financing, as part of his plan to balance the budget. Much like the City of Memphis, TIF in California was siphoning off an enormous amount of property tax revenue: 12 percent overall.²⁶ In some California municipalities, TIF had become a major budgetary item: as many as 25 percent of property taxes were going into TIF accounts.²⁷

When efforts to reform California TIFs failed, the state dissolved the authority of localities to have TIF districts and began the process of unwinding the existing debt obligations of TIF districts. While in the short term those debts will prevent a large immediate savings in California, the reforms will prove worthwhile in the long run. According to the California Legislative Analyst's Office, "Within about 20 years... property tax revenues for [school] districts, counties, cities, and special districts will be about 10 percent to 15 percent higher than they otherwise would have been. These property tax revenues may be used for any local program or local priority."²⁸

California's significant cost savings through abolition of TIF subsidies provides a useful example to policy-makers in Memphis. Spending less on PILOT subsidies would free up property tax revenues for other fiscal priorities.

Other Subsidy Burdens

PILOT agreements are not the only form of business subsidy burdening the finances of Memphis.

Pyramid Arena. Built a quarter century ago as a tourism magnet, the publicly-financed Pyramid Arena turned out to be a white elephant. Now, in a case of what looks like throwing good money after bad, the city is contributing to a \$197 million plan to transform the site into a huge retail outlet for Bass Pro Shops, a company with a long track record of negotiating lucrative subsidy deals that often do not pay off for the localities picking up the tab.

A significant part of the debt taken on to subsidize the Bass Pro project is being financed with sales tax revenues generated by the project as well as other facilities such as the Pinch District and the Memphis Cook Convention Center. In FY2012 the debt service for the bonds was about \$2.5 million; in FY2014 the amount jumps to \$7.4 million.²⁹

Electrolux. In 2010 Memphis used its bonding capacity, along with a PILOT agreement, to subsidize a factory to be built by Sweden-based Electrolux, the world's second-largest appliance maker. The company considered Memphis and sites in Alabama and North Carolina as it relocated production from a unionized facility in Quebec to what will be a non-union facility in Memphis, dislocating 1,200 Canadian workers.

Memphis "won" the competition with a lucrative overall subsidy package worth \$228 million composed of cash grants, PILOT property tax abatements worth an estimated \$33.9 million at the time, plus federal aid, state tax credits and more.³⁰

The Memphis *Commercial Appeal* estimated the cost at \$152,000 per job created, not including the costs associated with local bonds. The *Commercial Appeal* also revealed that, despite the deal's enormous costs, the secretly negotiated subsidy package contains no clawback provisions: if Electrolux falls short on job creation, taxpayers will have no money-back protection.³¹

Part of the Electrolux package included government borrowing by both Memphis and Shelby County. These 25-year bonds will not be paid off until 2036 and are backed by local sales tax revenues and business taxes. It is estimated that Memphis taxpayers will pay \$28 million in interest over the life of the bonds; the city's share of that in 2013 was about \$883,000.³²

Redbirds Autozone Park. In 1998, the City of Memphis and Shelby County each paid \$4.25 million to purchase land as a subsidy for a group of investors who wanted to build a stadium for the Memphis Redbirds minor league baseball team.³³ The Center City Revenue Finance Corporation also issued tax-exempt bonds for the project, giving a lower interest rate to the Redbirds.

Autozone Park eventually became the most lavish minor league baseball stadium ever built,

costing \$80.5 million.³⁴ But the expensive ballpark would eventually become a growing burden on Memphis taxpayers that would threaten the overall health of the Memphis' finances.

In 2010, Redbird owners defaulted on their \$1.6 million tax-exempt bond payment owed on \$57 million in remaining debt. Several factors were cited for the franchise's financial struggles including a glut of other local sports teams competing for limited fan dollars, the recession, and ambitious attendance projections that proved far off the mark.

A Wall Street private equity firm specializing in distressed municipal debt saw the Redbird's struggle as a lucrative opportunity. In 2010, Fundamental Advisors bought \$57.4 million worth of private bonds owed on the stadium construction for \$24 million, or 38 cents on the dollar. In order to profit on their speculative investment, Fundamental Advisors needed to find new owners for both the team and the stadium. It soon did both.

By November 2013, rumors of a taxpayer bailout of the Redbirds stadium began making headlines. Fundamental Advisors threatened that failure to ink a new subsidy deal before the end of the year would result in the hedge fund foreclosing on the stadium.

Wall Street was asking Main Street to issue \$27 million in revenue bonds to purchase the previously subsidized stadium. These bonds would be paid off not only from sales taxes on stadium activity and rent from the team, but also PILOTs from a nearby parking garage and historic office building. The debt service in 2015 will be about \$2.1 million a year.³⁵

Before the city council even voted on the stadium deal, Moody's Investors Service raised concerns about the deal and changed its outlook on Memphis general obligation debt from "stable" to "negative."³⁶ In other words, a major credit rating agency believed that the

subsidy package increased the likelihood that Memphis could default on some of its bonds. It also issued a negative outlook on the bonds issued for the redevelopment of the Pyramid as well. Moody's warning also specifically cited the city's unresolved pension issues. Eventually, the council approved a less lucrative deal for Fundamental Advisors. Memphis approved a \$24 million bond to purchase the stadium from Fundamental Advisors and also paid for additional improvements to the stadium, despite it being the most expensive minor league park ever built.³⁷ Fundamental Advisors was reported to have earned a return of 6 percent on its investment, though the return would be much higher for some tax-advantaged investors.³⁸

FedEx Forum. In 2001, Memphis wooed the NBA Grizzlies from Vancouver, Canada. At first, the team played at the Pyramid Arena. Despite having sunk massive taxpayer subsidies into the Pyramid project, Memphis built a new stadium for the team in 2004, selling the naming rights to what became the FedEx Forum.

Consistent with the academic consensus that sports venues do not create net new economic activity but instead simply move a finite amount of leisure time dollars around, the Forum's opening was said to have cannibalized attendance at the Redbirds stadium, which continued to suffer drops in ticket sales.

The stadium cost \$250 million to build and is owned by the City of Memphis and Shelby County. It was financed by public bonds backed by numerous revenue streams including seat rental fees, sales taxes, car rental taxes, hotel taxes, and \$2.5 million in annual PILOT revenues paid by Memphis Light, Gas, and Water.³⁹ A total of \$206 million was borrowed, the city and the county each contributed \$12 million, and \$20 million for the parking garage came from the state.⁴⁰ The parking garage was apparently done in violation of state rules, and the city later had to forfeit \$6.5 million in state dollars.⁴¹

The cost to the city was about \$1.2 million in 2013.⁴²

All the public resources spent backing risky sports stadium deals and retail redevelopments have an impact on Memphis' budget and economy. They siphon away revenues that could be spent on public services, education or infrastructure.

Table 3

Subsidized Project	Estimated Annual Cost of Financing
The Pyramid Arena (Bass Pro) ⁴³	\$2.5 million (2012) \$7.4 million (2014)
Redbirds Stadium ⁴⁴	\$2.1 million (2015)
FedEx Forum (Grizzlies) ⁴⁵	\$1.2 million (2013)
Electrolux ⁴⁶	\$883,788 (2013)

Conclusion

Memphis' spending on subsidy deals for companies and sports franchises is eroding the revenues needed to adequately fund public services. Worse, since 2009, Memphis has knowingly made inadequate contributions to workers' pensions while simultaneously continuing to chase sports stadiums and companies with eight- and nine-figure subsidies.

Memphis subsidizes companies in an almost concealed way: although PILOT revenues (the drastically reduced property taxes some companies get to pay) show up in the city's budget, PILOT spending (the property taxes abated and foregone) is difficult to account for in the city's budget. The complicated nature of debt obligations on bonds for stadiums and redevelopment projects also obscures the true costs of subsidies to the city.

Any fair budgeting discussion of pensions must include the enormous revenues diverted by subsidies. When tax increment financing (or TIF, property tax diversion) reform efforts fell short

in California, Gov. Jerry Brown and the state’s legislature ended the state’s TIF program altogether. In the long run, local jurisdictions there will see a 10 to 15 percent increase in property tax revenues over what they would have received.

For every year between 2009 and 2012, the revenues lost by Memphis to economic development subsidies exceeded the annual cost of funding the city’s pension system. This report is intended to put the two forms of spending into perspective.

Finally, pensions are not the only opportunity cost of PILOTs, stadiums and development subsidies. Adequate investments in education and infrastructure are proven winners for job creation and personal income growth. Economic development works best when it benefits all employers, not just those few able to win special deals.

Appendix A: Subsidy Costs Compared to Pension Obligations

Year	Memphis PILOT Revenue Diversions ⁴⁷	Memphis Stadium & Redevelopment Subsidy Costs ⁴⁸	Total Memphis Subsidy Costs	Total Pension Employer Normal Cost ⁴⁹	Subsidy Costs as a Percent of Employer Normal Costs
2009	\$41,153,850	\$875,000	\$42,028,850	\$31,056,000	135%
2010	\$40,851,799	\$4,269,000	\$45,120,799	\$32,614,000	138%
2011	\$41,673,882	\$1,025,000	\$42,698,882	\$34,785,000	123%
2012	\$39,073,453	\$4,647,138	\$43,720,591	\$33,492,000	131%

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Endnotes

¹ See www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals

² “Council members have to step up,” *The Commercial Appeal*, June 17, 2014

³ Since 2009, the city of Memphis underfunded worker pensions. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-14/memphis-pension-blues-foretold-with-tennessee-bill-muni-credit.html>

⁴ Memphis funded its pensions while contributing less than what similar cities contributed for their employees’ Social Security alone (aside and separate from their pension costs). Memphis public workers are not eligible for Social Security. http://www.cityofmemphis.org/Portals/0/pdf_forms/Pension%20Reform%20Report%20Review-Complete-Nov7.pdf

⁵ The figures are based on *City of Memphis Retirement System Actuarial Valuation as of July 1, 2010*. Available on page 2: <http://www.iaff1784.org/docs/Pension%20Report%20FY2011.pdf>

City of Memphis Retirement System Actuarial Valuation as of July 1, 2012. Available on page 2:

<http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/787477-memphis-2012-13-pension-valuation-report-final.html>

⁶ http://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/work/contribution-requirements.pdf

⁷ http://www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/fy2013_adopted_op/fy2013_adopted_op.pdf (p.96).

⁸ The county portion of the \$468 million figure was calculated by Good Jobs First based on data in Subsidy Tracker: <http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker>. This data in turn came from Shelby County Trustee 2007 to 2013 Annual Reports of In-Lieu Properties, available online at: <http://www.shelbycountytrustee.com/Archive.aspx?AMID=4>. The way we derived the city portion is explained in Note 9.

⁹ For deals approved during the past few years, the EDGE database details the cost split between Shelby County and the City of Memphis. Unfortunately, there is no readily available, downloadable spreadsheet that clearly spells out all the costs to Memphis (as opposed to Shelby County) for earlier PILOT subsidies. It would also be useful if EDGE made a spreadsheet available that detailed other important metrics about the promises made from PILOT recipients and the tangible outcomes achieved by those recipients. Because of these data limitations, we looked at a sample of recent subsidies and estimated that the city accounted for about 48 percent of costs and the county 52 percent. We derived an estimate for the city's share of PILOT costs for earlier deals by taking the figures from the Shelby County Trustee reports and applying the 52-48 split.

¹⁰ To obtain the total potential property tax revenues, we added the total property tax revenues with the total PILOT revenues in FY 2013 Memphis Adopted Budget. We then added those figures to the total estimated Memphis portion of PILOT subsidy figures (see note 9) found in the Shelby County Trustee's Annual report for that year: http://www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/fy2013_adopted_op/fy2013_adopted_op.pdf (pp.92, 96).

¹¹ These data were collected from the Shelby County Trustee. Good Jobs First digitized these records and incorporated them into our Subsidy Tracker database. Searching for Shelby County PILOT subsidies will make the data available for download and analysis: www.subsidytracker.com
<http://www.shelbycountytrustee.com/Archive.aspx?AMID=41>

¹² To obtain the total potential property taxes lost from PILOTs, we divided the second column by the first column.

¹³ Based on Good Jobs First calculations using PILOT subsidy data and the FY 2013 Memphis Adopted Budget: http://www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/fy2013_adopted_op/fy2013_adopted_op.pdf \$21.9 million figure represents 48 percent (see note 9) of Memphis share of 2013 cost of PILOTs in Memphis.

¹⁴ Calculated by Good Jobs First based on data in Subsidy Tracker. Search Subsidy Tracker at www.subsidytracker.com for County PILOT agreements.

¹⁵ <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/nov/12/edge-working-to-make-corporate-tax-breaks-more/?print=1>. The EDGE database is available at: <http://database.growth-engine.org/>
<http://www.smartcitymemphis.com/2013/03/edge-shines-light-on-pilot-process/>

¹⁶ <http://growth-engine.org/archive/?g=/Compliance>

¹⁷ <http://growth-engine.org/archive/?g=/Compliance>

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- ¹⁸ <http://growth-engine.org/archive/?g=/Compliance>
- ¹⁹ <http://growth-engine.org/archive/?g=/Compliance>
- ²⁰ Thomas Bailey Jr, et al, "15-year breaks part of IP plan," The Commercial Appeal, November 14, 2012. And <http://database.growth-engine.org/pilots/International+Paper>
- ²¹ Wayne Risher. "Offer to Pinnacle sweetened by \$3M; Council approves grant to aid garage deal." The Commercial Appeal. August 25, 2010; "Pinnacle sticks with Memphis October." The Commercial Appeal. October 8, 2010; Samantha Bomkamp. "Pinnacle Airlines files for bankruptcy protection." Chattanooga Times Free Press. April 3, 2012. Additional information obtained at: <http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/blog/memphis-in-motion/2013/04/pinnacle-airlines-to-leave-memphis.html>
- ²² Amos Maki. "City OKs tax freeze to retain jobs; PILOT incentive aims to keep companies here." The Commercial Appeal. Toby Sells. "McKesson will build in Olive Branch; 300 jobs will shift from Shelby County." The Commercial Appeal. May 26, 2010.
- ²³ <http://database.growth-engine.org/search-results/pilots/>
- ²⁴ http://www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/fy2013_adopted_op/fy2013_adopted_op.pdf
- ²⁵ http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/chicago_pensions_0.pdf
- ²⁶ http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-021712.aspx
- ²⁷ http://lao.ca.gov/analysis/2011/realignment/redevelopment_020911.pdf
- ²⁸ http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-021712.aspx
- ²⁹ <http://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/Issuer?id=A1DD9767B6D64E78490E4E90FEBF56E9&type=G> (p.21)
- ³⁰ <http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals>
- ³¹ <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/sep/18/electrolux-project-high-price-big-risks-memphis/?print=1>
- ³² <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/sep/18/calculating-costs-benefits-electrolux-memphis/>
<http://www.commercialappeal.com/electrolux/final-costs-of-the-local-electrolux-bonds/>
- ³³ <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2014/jan/27/shelby-county-commission-oks-autozone-deal/>
- ³⁴ <http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm45ggjk/t9-memphis-redbirds/>
- ³⁵ <http://emma.msrb.org/EA592985-EA463698-EA859886.pdf> (p.18).
- ³⁶ <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/dec/07/moodys-bond-rating-agency-raises-concerns-about/>
- ³⁷ <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/memphis-and-cardinals-partner-in-deal-to-revitalize-ballpark/>
http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10689415/st-louis-cardinals-close-deal-buy-triple-memphis-team

³⁸ <http://thecardinalnationblog.com/2013/11/03/autozone-park-sale-plan-%E2%80%9Cfairly-close%E2%80%9D/>

³⁹ http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_203/memphis-sue-grizzlies-nba-season-1032310-1.html
<http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/aug/04/long-nba-lockout-could-sap-arena-fund/>

⁴⁰ Page 109. <http://emma.msrb.org/ER559141-ER433745-ER836092.pdf>

⁴¹ <http://www.fieldofschemes.com/2006/06/12/1466/sorry-was-that-your-garage/>

⁴² http://www.cityofmemphis.org/Portals/0/pdf_forms/2013_CAFR.PDF (p.90).

⁴³ <http://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/Issuer?id=A1DD9767B6D64E78490E4E90FEBF56E9&type=G> (p.21)

⁴⁴ <http://emma.msrb.org/EA592985-EA463698-EA859886.pdf> (p.18).

⁴⁵ http://www.cityofmemphis.org/Portals/0/pdf_forms/2013_CAFR.PDF (p.90).

⁴⁶ <http://www.commercialappeal.com/electrolux/final-costs-of-the-local-electrolux-bonds/>

⁴⁷ Good Jobs First calculation. See endnote 9.

⁴⁸ The 2009 figure relates only to the FedEx Forum. See page 117 of
<http://www.memphistn.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=L6yZsnghLps%3d&tabid=102&portalid=0&mid=1694>.

The 2010 figure also relates only to the FedEx Forum. See page 84 of
<http://www.memphistn.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=AufVed8AgkA%3d&tabid=102&portalid=0&mid=1694>

The 2011 figure is the total of the FedEx Forum figure from page 96 of
<http://www.memphistn.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=PvxGuJBNHs%3d&tabid=102&portalid=0&mid=1694>
and the Electrolux figure (divided in half to get \$59,419) from page 2 of
<http://www.commercialappeal.com/electrolux/final-costs-of-the-local-electrolux-bonds/>

The 2012 figure is the total of the \$2.5 million for the Pyramid arena cited in Note 40, the Electrolux figure (divided in half to get \$1.2 million) from the source just cited for 2011 and the FedEx Forum figure of \$969,000 from page 90 of
<http://www.memphistn.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=43CwrFvDy60%3d&tabid=102&portalid=0&mid=1694>

⁴⁹ <http://www.iaff1784.org/docs/Pension%20Report%20FY2011.pdf>
See Page 2: <http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/787477-memphis-2012-13-pension-valuation-report-final.html>